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{{DISPLAYTITLE:Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019}}
{{DISPLAYTITLE:Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019}}


=== Background and Introduction to POFMA ===
The '''Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019''' (POFMA; Act 18 of 2019) is a Singapore statute that empowers government ministers to act against statements they identify as false statements of fact communicated online in Singapore, where doing so is in the public interest as defined in the Act. It was passed by Parliament on 8 May 2019, assented to on 3 June 2019, and came into force on 2 October 2019.<ref name="passage">See [[Parliamentary passage of the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act]].</ref>
The ''Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act'' (POFMA) was enacted in Singapore in October 2019, positioning itself as one of the most stringent laws globally to address misinformation.  


POFMA grants government ministers sweeping powers to respond to online content deemed to be “falsehoods” that may influence public perception, social harmony, or national security.  
: ''See [[Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods]] for the pre-legislative inquiry that recommended the Act; [[Parliamentary passage of the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act]] for the Bill's debate and passage; [[POFMA directions]] for the record of directions issued; and [[POFMA appeals]] for how the courts have reviewed them.''


Under POFMA, ministers can issue correction, removal, or disabling directions to individuals, organisations, and online platforms, even when those platforms are hosted overseas.
== Purpose and structure ==
The Act's stated purpose is to prevent the communication of false statements of fact in Singapore and to enable measures counteracting the effects of such communication, and to suppress the ability of online accounts and locations that repeatedly do so to gain financial or other benefit.<ref name="ca-purpose">''The Online Citizen Pte Ltd v Attorney-General and another appeal and other matters'' [2021] SGCA 96 at [85]–[86]. https://www.elitigation.sg/gd/s/2021_SGCA_96</ref> Part 3 of the Act governs directions issued to individual publishers; Part 4 governs directions issued to internet intermediaries and other platforms; Part 5 concerns measures against online locations and accounts that repeatedly communicate falsehoods, including demonetisation and access-blocking; Part 6 concerns inauthentic online accounts and bots.


The law was introduced as part of Singapore's effort to combat the rapid spread of misinformation on social media and to prevent potential threats to national stability, following the recommendations of a Select Committee on Online Falsehoods.
=== Statement of fact and falsity ===
A "statement of fact" is one a reasonable person would consider a representation of fact, as distinct from opinion, comment, criticism, or satire.<ref name="s2a">Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019, s 2(2)(a).</ref> A statement is "false" if it is false or misleading, whether wholly or in part, and whether on its own or in the context in which it appears.<ref name="s2b">POFMA, s 2(2)(b).</ref> A direction may issue even where the person communicating the statement does not know or have reason to believe it is false.<ref name="s11-4">POFMA, s 11(4); s 12(4).</ref>


The Ministry of Law, which spearheaded the legislation, argued that POFMA is necessary to protect the public against the potential harm of falsehoods, such as undermining trust in institutions, affecting electoral outcomes, or spreading public panic.  
=== Public interest ===
A minister may act only where he or she is of the opinion that doing so is in the public interest, defined non-exhaustively to include the security of Singapore, public health, public finances, public safety or tranquillity, friendly relations with other countries, the integrity of elections and referendums, preventing incitement of enmity between groups, and preventing a diminution of public confidence in the Government or other public institutions.<ref name="s4">POFMA, s 4.</ref>


POFMA provides for various forms of government response, including correction directions (adding a correction label to content), take-down orders, and “general correction directions” aimed at platforms like Facebook or Twitter, requiring them to alert all users who might have been exposed to a particular piece of false information.
=== Directions ===
A Correction Direction requires the recipient to carry a correction notice alongside the original material; a Stop Communication Direction requires the recipient to cease communicating the statement in Singapore.<ref name="s11-12">POFMA, ss 11–12.</ref> Corresponding Targeted and General Correction Directions, and Disabling Directions, apply to internet intermediaries and other platforms under Part 4.<ref name="s21-25">POFMA, ss 21–25.</ref> An online location that has been the subject of three or more directions within six months may be declared a "Declared Online Location", triggering demonetisation and, for internet service providers, potential access-blocking.<ref name="s32-37">POFMA, ss 32–37.</ref>


However, since its introduction, POFMA has drawn considerable criticism both domestically and internationally, with concerns about its impact on free speech, the centralised power it grants to government officials, and its potential use as a political tool.
=== Appeal process ===
A recipient must first apply to the relevant minister to vary or cancel a direction; if refused, an appeal lies to the General Division of the High Court, which may set the direction aside only on the grounds that the statement was not communicated in Singapore, that it is not a false statement of fact, or that compliance is not technically possible.<ref name="s17">POFMA, s 17.</ref> The courts' interpretation of this framework — including the governing five-step analytical test, the burden of proof, and the Act's constitutionality — is covered in detail at [[POFMA appeals]].


== '''Key Provisions of POFMA''' ==
== Use of the Act ==
The Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) grants significant powers to government ministers, enabling them to address content deemed false or harmful. Key provisions include:
{{Main|POFMA directions}}
According to the POFMA Office's own published statistics, as at 1 July 2026 the Act had been used in 92 cases, comprising 146 Correction Directions, 39 Targeted Correction Directions, 5 General Correction Directions, 5 Access Blocking Orders, 3 Access Disabling Orders, 10 Declaration Notices, and 27 Declared Online Locations; no Stop Communication Directions, Disabling Directions, or Account Restriction Directions had been issued as at that date.<ref name="pofma-office-stats">"POFMA Action Taken Up To 1 Jul 2026", POFMA Office. https://www.pofmaoffice.gov.sg/stats/permalink/</ref> A detailed, Cargo-backed record of individual directions, searchable by ministry, target, and underlying incident, is maintained at [[POFMA directions]]; that page's dataset is a representative sample under active backfill against the fuller historical record, not yet a complete match to the official tally above.


# '''Issuance of Correction Directions''' and :  Government ministers may instruct individuals or platforms to append correction notices to content identified as false, including a link to the government’s clarification.
== Notable applications ==
# '''Content Removal or Disablement''':  Ministers can mandate the removal or disablement of content if it is assessed as potentially harmful to public interest.
# '''General Correction Directions''':  For widely shared falsehoods, platforms can be required to display correction notices to all Singapore-based users, irrespective of their interaction with the content.
# '''Penalties for Non-Compliance''':  Individuals face fines of up to S$20,000 and imprisonment of up to one year, while companies may incur fines up to S$500,000.


Ministers have the authority to determine whether a statement qualifies as a falsehood and can issue correction or removal directions without prior judicial approval. Although affected parties can appeal in court, they must first comply with the directive and manage the potentially high legal costs of the appeal process.
=== First use of section 11(3)(b) against The Online Citizen ===
In March 2026, a Correction Direction issued to The Online Citizen and its publisher used section 11(3)(b) of the Act for the first time, requiring a correction notice to be published in The Straits Times rather than only on TOC's own platforms. The Ministry of Digital Development and Information and the Ministry of Law said the step followed what they described as TOC's persistent publication of false and misleading content despite multiple prior directions, including two prior designations of its pages as Declared Online Locations, in July 2023 and July 2025.<ref name="cna-toc-2026">"POFMA clause used against The Online Citizen for first time", Channel NewsAsia, 25 March 2026. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/pofma-clause-online-citizen-terry-xu-straits-times-6015451</ref> TOC said it complied because the law required it to, while disputing the government's characterisation of its reporting.<ref name="cna-toc-2026" />


=== Section 15: Non-Compliance as an Offence ===
=== Declined use against AI-generated videos targeting the Prime Minister ===
Under Section 15, non-compliance with a Part 3 Direction constitutes an offence. Key details include:
In early 2026, close to 300 AI-generated Chinese-language YouTube videos circulated fabricated claims about Prime Minister Lawrence Wong's political standing, reportedly reaching millions of views; the government did not issue POFMA directions in response. Minister for Digital Development and Information Josephine Teo told Parliament, in response to a question from Workers' Party MP Fadli Fawzi, that most of the identified accounts had already been removed by YouTube for violating its own policies, making a formal direction unnecessary in that instance, while acknowledging that similar accounts continued to resurface.<ref name="wp-written-answer">Written Answers to WP's Oral Questions and Written Questions, 5 March 2026, Workers' Party. https://www.wp.sg/parliament/written-answers-to-wps-oral-questions-and-written-questions-on-05-mar-2026</ref><ref name="mddi-response-2026">"MDDI's Response to PQ on POFMA Action On Allegedly AI-Generated YouTube Video On 17 January 2026 about Prime Minister Wong", Ministry of Digital Development and Information. https://www.mddi.gov.sg/newsroom/mddi-s-response-to-pq-on-pofma-action-on-allegedly-ai-generated-youtube-video-on-17-january-2026-about-prime-minister-wong/</ref> This decision was cited by some commentators as an illustration of the gap between the categories of threat POFMA's 2019 sponsors described in Parliament and the categories of target the Act has been applied to in practice.<ref name="toc-commentary-2026">"Refusing to POFMA AI disinformation targeting PM Wong exposes what the law is really for", The Online Citizen, 6 March 2026. https://theonlinecitizen.com/2026/03/06/refusing-to-pofma-ai-disinformation-targeting-pm-wong-exposes-what-the-law-is-really-for</ref>


# '''Penalties for Individuals and Companies''':
== Debate and criticism ==
#* '''Individuals''': A fine not exceeding S$20,000 or imprisonment for up to 12 months, or both.
POFMA's passage and subsequent use have been the subject of sustained debate, summarised here by position rather than asserted as settled fact; see [[Parliamentary passage of the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act]] for the full parliamentary debate and [[Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods]] for the pre-legislative inquiry and its critics.
#* '''Companies''': A fine not exceeding S$500,000.
# '''Defences Not Permissible''':  It is not a valid defence to argue that legal, contractual, or professional obligations prevented compliance, nor that an application to vary or cancel the direction was filed.
# '''Immunity for Good Faith Compliance''':  No civil or criminal liability is incurred for actions taken in reasonable care and good faith to comply with or execute a Part 3 Direction.


=== Section 7: Communication of False Statements of Fact ===
The Government's position, put by then-Law Minister K Shanmugam and other ministers during the Bill's Second Reading, was that the Act's powers were narrower than existing legislation, subject to direct appeal to the High Court rather than judicial review alone, and necessary to counter the speed and scale at which online falsehoods — including foreign-linked disinformation operations — could spread.<ref name="passage" /> The Court of Appeal upheld the Act's constitutionality on this basis in 2021, holding that a Correction Direction does not itself restrict the recipient's continued publication of the original material.<ref name="ca-purpose" />
Section 7 addresses the communication of false statements of fact, highlighting:


# '''Prohibition''':  Individuals must not communicate a statement, knowing or having reason to believe it is false and likely to:
The Workers' Party's central objection, maintained throughout the Bill's passage and in its subsequent parliamentary questions, is that vesting the initial determination of falsity in the same ministers whose portfolios or conduct a statement may concern creates a structural conflict of interest, and that the courts, not the Executive, should be the first arbiter of contested facts.<ref name="passage" /> International organisations including Human Rights Watch and Reporters Without Borders raised similar concerns during the Select Committee's hearings, and civil society participants in those hearings described the proceedings as adversarial.<ref name="select-committee">See [[Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods]].</ref>
#* Jeopardise Singapore’s security, public health, safety, or finances.
#* Affect public tranquillity or relations with other countries.
#* Influence elections, incite enmity, or erode public confidence in government entities.
# '''Penalties''':
#* '''Individuals''': A fine up to S$50,000 or imprisonment up to five years, or both.
#* '''Companies''': A fine up to S$500,000.
# '''Use of Inauthentic Accounts or Bots''':  Stricter penalties apply if inauthentic online accounts or bots are used to accelerate the dissemination of falsehoods:
#* '''Individuals''': A fine up to S$100,000 or imprisonment up to 10 years, or both.
#* '''Companies''': A fine up to S$1 million.


== Criticism and Concerns ==
A separate line of criticism concerns the pattern of the Act's use rather than its constitutional structure: that the large majority of directions have been issued against identifiable domestic individuals, media outlets, and political parties, while the instruments designed for anonymous, platform-scale, or foreign-linked operations — the category of threat most emphasised in the Bill's 2019 parliamentary debate — have been used comparatively rarely, including in cases publicly identified as involving such operations.<ref name="toc-commentary-2026" /> The Government's response in individual cases has generally been that platform cooperation or an absence of an identifiable, servable local recipient made formal directions unnecessary or impractical.<ref name="mddi-response-2026" />


=== 1. '''Concerns Over Free Speech and Self-Censorship''' ===
== See also ==
One of the most widely voiced concerns about POFMA is its potential to infringe upon free speech. Critics argue that the law enables the government to control public discourse and restrict dissenting viewpoints.
* [[Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods]]
* [[Parliamentary passage of the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act]]
* [[POFMA directions]]
* [[POFMA appeals]]


By giving ministers the authority to determine what constitutes “falsehoods” without judicial oversight, POFMA centralises the power to police speech within the executive branch. Many international human rights organisations, including Human Rights Watch and Reporters Without Borders, have condemned the law, arguing that it sets a dangerous precedent for freedom of expression in Singapore.
== References ==
 
<references />
Local activists and opposition figures have also voiced concerns that POFMA creates a climate of self-censorship. With the knowledge that critical statements could be targeted by a correction directive, individuals and news outlets may hesitate to express dissenting opinions or report on controversial issues.
 
The law has also been used on multiple occasions to address social media posts by civil society groups, opposition politicians, and activists, raising questions about its use in silencing criticism under the guise of protecting the public from misinformation.
 
=== 2. '''Judicial Oversight and the Burden of Appeals''' ===
POFMA’s appeal process places the burden of proof and legal costs on individuals or organisations issued with correction directions. This arrangement has raised concerns that challenging POFMA directives is financially daunting, especially for individuals or smaller entities that lack the resources to mount a legal appeal.
 
Although parties can seek judicial review of a POFMA directive, the law requires them to comply with the directive first, which may diminish the impact of any eventual court ruling in their favour.
 
The absence of independent judicial oversight at the initial stage also raises questions about checks and balances. By concentrating decision-making authority within the executive, the law has been criticised for undermining the role of the judiciary in providing a neutral assessment of alleged falsehoods.
 
Some experts argue that this arrangement creates an imbalance, as it enables ministers to act as both the complainant and adjudicator in cases involving misinformation.
 
=== 3. '''Selective Application and Allegations of Political Bias''' ===
One of the more controversial aspects of POFMA is the perception that it may be selectively applied, especially against political opposition and activists.
 
Since its implementation, POFMA has been used against opposition politicians, critical news portals, and advocacy groups. The government, via alternate authorities, has issued correction directions against opposition figures during the general election, leading to claims that the law is being used as a tool for political advantage.
 
The government maintains that POFMA is applied objectively and solely in cases where false statements could harm public interest. However, critics point out that correction orders are disproportionately directed at opposition parties and government critics, rather than at pro-government entities or statements, even when these are disputed.
 
=== 4. '''Impact on Media and Independent Journalism''' ===
Singapore’s tightly regulated media environment has long been a topic of international scrutiny, and POFMA has intensified concerns about press freedom. 
 
Independent news portals and journalists who report critically on government actions have faced POFMA orders, which can damage their credibility by labelling their reporting as false.
 
Some observers argue that POFMA restricts investigative journalism, especially when coverage involves government-related topics that are contentious or sensitive.
 
Moreover, the law places added strain on smaller, independent media outlets that lack the resources to consistently fact-check every detail or challenge correction directives in court.
 
In contrast, the government appears lenient with mainstream media regarding errors in their reporting, often allowing them to issue corrections without a formal correction direction.
 
POFMA’s broad definitions and expansive powers risk pushing critical journalism to the margins, potentially depriving the public of alternative viewpoints and reducing the diversity of information available to Singaporean citizens.


[[Category:Legislation]]
[[Category:Legislation]]

Latest revision as of 09:58, 19 July 2026


The Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 (POFMA; Act 18 of 2019) is a Singapore statute that empowers government ministers to act against statements they identify as false statements of fact communicated online in Singapore, where doing so is in the public interest as defined in the Act. It was passed by Parliament on 8 May 2019, assented to on 3 June 2019, and came into force on 2 October 2019.[1]

See Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods for the pre-legislative inquiry that recommended the Act; Parliamentary passage of the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act for the Bill's debate and passage; POFMA directions for the record of directions issued; and POFMA appeals for how the courts have reviewed them.

Purpose and structure

The Act's stated purpose is to prevent the communication of false statements of fact in Singapore and to enable measures counteracting the effects of such communication, and to suppress the ability of online accounts and locations that repeatedly do so to gain financial or other benefit.[2] Part 3 of the Act governs directions issued to individual publishers; Part 4 governs directions issued to internet intermediaries and other platforms; Part 5 concerns measures against online locations and accounts that repeatedly communicate falsehoods, including demonetisation and access-blocking; Part 6 concerns inauthentic online accounts and bots.

Statement of fact and falsity

A "statement of fact" is one a reasonable person would consider a representation of fact, as distinct from opinion, comment, criticism, or satire.[3] A statement is "false" if it is false or misleading, whether wholly or in part, and whether on its own or in the context in which it appears.[4] A direction may issue even where the person communicating the statement does not know or have reason to believe it is false.[5]

Public interest

A minister may act only where he or she is of the opinion that doing so is in the public interest, defined non-exhaustively to include the security of Singapore, public health, public finances, public safety or tranquillity, friendly relations with other countries, the integrity of elections and referendums, preventing incitement of enmity between groups, and preventing a diminution of public confidence in the Government or other public institutions.[6]

Directions

A Correction Direction requires the recipient to carry a correction notice alongside the original material; a Stop Communication Direction requires the recipient to cease communicating the statement in Singapore.[7] Corresponding Targeted and General Correction Directions, and Disabling Directions, apply to internet intermediaries and other platforms under Part 4.[8] An online location that has been the subject of three or more directions within six months may be declared a "Declared Online Location", triggering demonetisation and, for internet service providers, potential access-blocking.[9]

Appeal process

A recipient must first apply to the relevant minister to vary or cancel a direction; if refused, an appeal lies to the General Division of the High Court, which may set the direction aside only on the grounds that the statement was not communicated in Singapore, that it is not a false statement of fact, or that compliance is not technically possible.[10] The courts' interpretation of this framework — including the governing five-step analytical test, the burden of proof, and the Act's constitutionality — is covered in detail at POFMA appeals.

Use of the Act

Main article: POFMA directions

According to the POFMA Office's own published statistics, as at 1 July 2026 the Act had been used in 92 cases, comprising 146 Correction Directions, 39 Targeted Correction Directions, 5 General Correction Directions, 5 Access Blocking Orders, 3 Access Disabling Orders, 10 Declaration Notices, and 27 Declared Online Locations; no Stop Communication Directions, Disabling Directions, or Account Restriction Directions had been issued as at that date.[11] A detailed, Cargo-backed record of individual directions, searchable by ministry, target, and underlying incident, is maintained at POFMA directions; that page's dataset is a representative sample under active backfill against the fuller historical record, not yet a complete match to the official tally above.

Notable applications

First use of section 11(3)(b) against The Online Citizen

In March 2026, a Correction Direction issued to The Online Citizen and its publisher used section 11(3)(b) of the Act for the first time, requiring a correction notice to be published in The Straits Times rather than only on TOC's own platforms. The Ministry of Digital Development and Information and the Ministry of Law said the step followed what they described as TOC's persistent publication of false and misleading content despite multiple prior directions, including two prior designations of its pages as Declared Online Locations, in July 2023 and July 2025.[12] TOC said it complied because the law required it to, while disputing the government's characterisation of its reporting.[12]

Declined use against AI-generated videos targeting the Prime Minister

In early 2026, close to 300 AI-generated Chinese-language YouTube videos circulated fabricated claims about Prime Minister Lawrence Wong's political standing, reportedly reaching millions of views; the government did not issue POFMA directions in response. Minister for Digital Development and Information Josephine Teo told Parliament, in response to a question from Workers' Party MP Fadli Fawzi, that most of the identified accounts had already been removed by YouTube for violating its own policies, making a formal direction unnecessary in that instance, while acknowledging that similar accounts continued to resurface.[13][14] This decision was cited by some commentators as an illustration of the gap between the categories of threat POFMA's 2019 sponsors described in Parliament and the categories of target the Act has been applied to in practice.[15]

Debate and criticism

POFMA's passage and subsequent use have been the subject of sustained debate, summarised here by position rather than asserted as settled fact; see Parliamentary passage of the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act for the full parliamentary debate and Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods for the pre-legislative inquiry and its critics.

The Government's position, put by then-Law Minister K Shanmugam and other ministers during the Bill's Second Reading, was that the Act's powers were narrower than existing legislation, subject to direct appeal to the High Court rather than judicial review alone, and necessary to counter the speed and scale at which online falsehoods — including foreign-linked disinformation operations — could spread.[1] The Court of Appeal upheld the Act's constitutionality on this basis in 2021, holding that a Correction Direction does not itself restrict the recipient's continued publication of the original material.[2]

The Workers' Party's central objection, maintained throughout the Bill's passage and in its subsequent parliamentary questions, is that vesting the initial determination of falsity in the same ministers whose portfolios or conduct a statement may concern creates a structural conflict of interest, and that the courts, not the Executive, should be the first arbiter of contested facts.[1] International organisations including Human Rights Watch and Reporters Without Borders raised similar concerns during the Select Committee's hearings, and civil society participants in those hearings described the proceedings as adversarial.[16]

A separate line of criticism concerns the pattern of the Act's use rather than its constitutional structure: that the large majority of directions have been issued against identifiable domestic individuals, media outlets, and political parties, while the instruments designed for anonymous, platform-scale, or foreign-linked operations — the category of threat most emphasised in the Bill's 2019 parliamentary debate — have been used comparatively rarely, including in cases publicly identified as involving such operations.[15] The Government's response in individual cases has generally been that platform cooperation or an absence of an identifiable, servable local recipient made formal directions unnecessary or impractical.[14]

See also

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 See Parliamentary passage of the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 The Online Citizen Pte Ltd v Attorney-General and another appeal and other matters [2021] SGCA 96 at [85]–[86]. https://www.elitigation.sg/gd/s/2021_SGCA_96
  3. ↑ Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019, s 2(2)(a).
  4. ↑ POFMA, s 2(2)(b).
  5. ↑ POFMA, s 11(4); s 12(4).
  6. ↑ POFMA, s 4.
  7. ↑ POFMA, ss 11–12.
  8. ↑ POFMA, ss 21–25.
  9. ↑ POFMA, ss 32–37.
  10. ↑ POFMA, s 17.
  11. ↑ "POFMA Action Taken Up To 1 Jul 2026", POFMA Office. https://www.pofmaoffice.gov.sg/stats/permalink/
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 "POFMA clause used against The Online Citizen for first time", Channel NewsAsia, 25 March 2026. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/pofma-clause-online-citizen-terry-xu-straits-times-6015451
  13. ↑ Written Answers to WP's Oral Questions and Written Questions, 5 March 2026, Workers' Party. https://www.wp.sg/parliament/written-answers-to-wps-oral-questions-and-written-questions-on-05-mar-2026
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 "MDDI's Response to PQ on POFMA Action On Allegedly AI-Generated YouTube Video On 17 January 2026 about Prime Minister Wong", Ministry of Digital Development and Information. https://www.mddi.gov.sg/newsroom/mddi-s-response-to-pq-on-pofma-action-on-allegedly-ai-generated-youtube-video-on-17-january-2026-about-prime-minister-wong/
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 "Refusing to POFMA AI disinformation targeting PM Wong exposes what the law is really for", The Online Citizen, 6 March 2026. https://theonlinecitizen.com/2026/03/06/refusing-to-pofma-ai-disinformation-targeting-pm-wong-exposes-what-the-law-is-really-for
  16. ↑ See Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods.
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